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ARGUMENT 
THE ALJ COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN SHE CONCLUDED THAT 
WORK BY A ONE ARMED MAN WITH A 57% IMPAIRMENT WAS NOT 
SUPERHUMAN. 
Throughout the course of this litigation, Olsen has simply asked for an opportunity 
to present evidence relevant to the odd-lot doctrine and to have the trier of fact apply the 
doctrine to the evidence. He has received neither. 
At hearing, Olsen attempted to present odd-lot evidence as it relates to his 
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restrictions of daily living. The ALJ refused to hear such evidence and in fact, refused 
Olsen even the opportunity to make an offer of proof, and improperly denied Olsen's 
claim. Olsen timely appealed, and three years later, the Commissioner made her own 
findings and denied Olsen's claim by entirely disregarding the appropriate legal standard 
under the odd-lot doctrine. 
As an initial matter, ERF, in its brief, repeatedly attributes the factual findings and 
reasoning of the ALJ to the Labor Commissioner. However, the Commissioner did not 
adopt the ALJ's factual findings or legal reasoning, but instead made her own factual 
findings and her own determination that the odd-lot doctrine did not apply. As the 
Commissioner is the ultimate finder of fact, the only decision properly before this Court is 
the Labor Commissioner's. Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission (Judd), 1994 
Utah App. LEXIS 192, 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. Ut. 1994). Consequently ERF is not 
at liberty to revive the ALJ's purported odd-lot analysis to justify the Commissioner's 
decision where the Commissioner herself rejected that analysis. 
The policy behind the odd-lot doctrine is to prevent the law from penalizing people 
who return to work in the face of serious industrial injuries. As such, the fact that an 
injured employee returned to work, even for a substantial amount of time, or that he 
worked until retirement age, are not sufficient bases in and of themselves on which to deny 
permanent total disability. See Norton v. Industrial Comm % 1986 Utah LEXIS 929, 728 
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 1987 Utah LEXIS 827, 748 
P.2d 572 (Utah 1987). Yet these are precisely the factors upon which the Commissioner 
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relies to deny Olsen permanent total disability benefits. 
With regard to the applicability of the odd-lot doctrine, Ifhe Utah Supreme Court 
stated, "Whether or not an employee falls into the odd-lot category depends on whether 
there is regular, dependable work available for the employee who does not rely on the 
sympathy of friends or his own superhuman efforts." Marshall v. Industrial Comm 'n, 
1984 Utah LEXIS 797, 681 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1984)(Empha^is added). Furthermore, 
"disability is evaluated not in the abstract, but in terms of the specific individual who has 
suffered a work-related injury." Hardman v. Salt Lake City F^et Management, 1986 
Utah LEXIS 866, 725 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986)(quoting Marshall at 211.) Thus, by 
definition, work is not regular or dependable if it is obtained through superhuman efforts or 
through the sympathy of friends. 
The Commissioner ignored the test as set forth in Marshall and Hardman. She 
made no attempt to determine whether the activities of Olsen wtare "superhuman efforts." 
The Commissioner simply indicates that Olsen "rose to the challenge" and was able to 
return to "regular dependable work." She states the obvious, (j)lsen did return to work. 
However, the question as to whether he did so through superhuman efforts is never 
addressed. 
Irrespective of the fact the ALJ would not permit Olsen to testify as to the 
limitations he had in his daily life, the evidence before the Compiission demonstrates that 
Olsen had returned to work through "superhuman efforts." It is undisputed that Olsen lost 
his left upper extremity in a traumatic amputation for which he ^as found to have lost 57% 
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of the use of his whole person. Within one week, Olsen returned to work. As the 
amputation was to his dominant arm, Olsen had to learn how to write and perform other 
tasks within his non-dominant hand. As Dr. Chase stated, Olsen was required to do the 
work of a two armed man with one hand. Olsen worked through pain which was daily at 
least a five on a zero to ten scale. He was only able to work because his wife helped him 
get dressed in the mornings. Most notably, he worked an extra two to three hours each 
day to receive the same pay that he received before the traumatic amputation. He took out 
early retirement because of pain and cellulitis in the stub left from the amputation. 
What both the Commissioner and ERF refuse to acknowledge is that a 
determination as to the applicability of the odd-lot doctrine requires a fact-intensive 
inquiry of the kind of evidence set forth above. The Commissioner misses the mark with 
her vague generalization of the evidence presented by Olsen. (R. at 97 - 101.) She pays 
lip service to the fact of the amputation, but fails to address how it affected Olsen's work 
life on its own merits. In no event did she engage in the relevant and necessary inquiry as 
to whether the manner in which Olsen "rose to the challenge" constituted superhuman 
efforts. Under established law, the only way the Commissioner could have determined 
that the odd-lot doctrine did not apply was by first finding that Olsen did not maintain 
employment by his own superhuman efforts. 
As a practical matter, the Commissioner's determination that "the evidence 
establishes that regular, dependable work was available to Mr. Olsen" has no basis in law 
or fact within the four comers of her own opinion. (R. at 99.) Moreover, making such a 
4 
determination without determining whether Olsen's perseverance in his employment was 
due in part to his own superhuman efforts is akin to solving a niathematical problem using 
only half the equation. Olsen respectfully submits that the Conbnissioner committed clear 
error by concluding as a matter of law that the odd-lot doctrine did not apply without first 
analyzing whether his continued employment was the result of his own superhuman 
efforts. 
Olsen has been systematically penalized for having maintained his employment 
after the traumatic amputation of his right arm at great persona} cost. The ALJ refused to 
consider the facts of Olsen's case. The Labor Commissioner h^s refused to apply the law. 
Since the time Olsen filed his Motion for Review in 2006, he h£.s simply asked that the 
Commission analyze his case under the applicable legal standards and make a 
determination as to whether the conditions under which he worked for 23 years after the 
amputation of his arm constituted superhuman efforts. 
The idea that Olsen has not been prejudiced by a three year ratification of incorrect 
legal principles is circular at best. Olsen suggests that the reasbnability of how long an 
administrative agency takes to render a decision is an objective test. It cannot be subject 
to the whims of budgetary problems as ERF, without evidentially support, argues. This 
Court has already stated that it is unreasonable for an administrative agency to take 17 
months to render an opinion. Rice v. Utah Sees. £>zv., 2004 Ut^h App. LEXIS 63, P. 95 
P.3d 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). For these reasons, Olsen respectfully requests that this 
Court enter an order granting permanent total disability benefit^ consistent with the 
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decision reached in Marshall and its progeny pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Olsen respectfully request that the Order Affirming 
ALJ's Decision be reversed and benefits be awarded Olsen by this Court consistent with 
the facts and the legal framework established under the odd-lot doctrine. 
DATED this £ * day of December, 2010. 
Laron J. Pifrsppey 
Elizabeth BT Grimshaw 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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